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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
Raymond Isaac was charged with: (1) conspiracy to 
possess marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of 
21 U.S.C. S 846; (2) possession of marijuana with intent to 
distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 841(a)(1); and (3) 
possession of marijuana on board a vessel arriving in the 
United States, in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 955. The jury 
found him guilty on the first two counts, and not guilty on 
the third. Isaac appeals his convictions, claiming that the 
district court inaccurately described the reasonable-doubt 
standard for the jury; failed to caution the jury on 
assessing the credibility of witnesses who, according to 
Isaac, should be considered accomplices or immunized 
witnesses; neglected to take judicial notice of the fact that 
identical charges against those witnesses were dropped "in 
response to the government's motion to dismiss" and 
allowed the prosecutor to intimate that Isaac's decision not 
to testify was evidence against him. We will affirm. 
 
I. FACTS 
 
On August 5, 1994, a boat mechanic working near docks 
used by the St. Thomas police marine unit noticed a 
strange boat tied up beside an abandoned barge and called 
Corporal Alan Roberts of the marine unit. When Corporal 
Roberts arrived, he found two men sitting on the barge, 
dressed in shorts and short-sleeved shirts and barefoot. 
They looked tired, bruised, sunburnt and dehydrated. Upon 
questioning by Corporal Roberts and U.S. Customs agents, 
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the men identified themselves as Conrad Brown and Irvin 
Reid and said that they had arrived on the boat from 
Jamaica. They also described a man they knew as "Rocky," 
who, they said, had accompanied them from Jamaica and 
had left the boat when they docked. 
 
Later, Roberts and U.S. Customs Agent Willis Smiley saw 
a man fitting the description of "Rocky" get out of a van 
that had pulled up near the dock. When Corporal Roberts 
and Agent Smiley approached the man, the van and an 
accompanying car sped off, but the man made no attempt 
to leave. Asked his name, the man replied, "Rocky." Agent 
Smiley then asked him what his real name was and he 
replied, "Raymond Isaac." Isaac was shown to Brown and 
Reid, and they identified him as the "Rocky" who had 
arrived with them in the boat from Jamaica. When customs 
agents searched the boat they found 29 bales of marijuana 
weighing approximately 582 pounds. 
 
Isaac, Brown and Reid were charged with conspiracy to 
possess marijuana with intent to distribute, possession of 
marijuana with intent to distribute, and possession of 
marijuana on board a vessel arriving in the United States. 
On the day the trial was to begin, the government moved to 
dismiss the charges against Brown and Reid. In a 
simultaneous motion to designate Brown and Reid as 
material witnesses and detain them pending Isaac's trial, 
the government stated that the charges against Brown and 
Reid had been dropped "in the interest of justice and the 
witnesses['] cooperation." 
 
At Isaac's subsequent trial, Brown and Reid testified that 
they had set out on July 31, 1994 to go fishing with 
"Rocky." Because it was a windy day, they had taken a 
larger, community-owned vessel called the "Community 
Aid." Brown and Reid were dressed for a day offishing, 
barefoot, in shorts and short-sleeved shirts. The three of 
them first stopped in Port Royal, where Isaac disembarked 
to get beer. He returned with a friend, and asked that the 
friend be allowed to accompany them. Brown agreed, and 
they fished for several hours. Isaac and his friend then had 
Brown and Reid take them to a nearby deserted island 
named Lime Cay. While Isaac and his friend drank beer 
under a tree, Brown and Reid took a walk. When they 
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returned, Isaac asked Brown if he would like to do "a drug 
move" for $20,000 in Jamaican dollars. Brown initially 
agreed, but then changed his mind when he grasped that 
a lengthy trip was involved. At that point, Brown and Reid 
claimed that Isaac's friend threatened them with a gun and 
forced them to remain on Lime Cay while he and Isaac 
departed in the boat. Brown was ready to swim to the 
mainland, but Reid did not think he could swim the nine or 
ten mile distance, so the two of them remained on the 
island. 
 
Several hours later, Isaac and his friend returned. The 
two five-gallon canisters of gasoline with which the boat 
had been equipped were gone, replaced by seven fifty-five- 
gallon drums of gasoline. The bow, which had been open, 
was now covered with a piece of plywood. Isaac's friend 
forced Brown and Reid to board at gunpoint, and Isaac, 
Brown and Reid departed, leaving the friend behind on the 
deserted island. 
 
Brown and Reid testified that they sailed for days, while 
Isaac navigated with the aid of charts and a global 
positioning system. Although Brown was at the helm most 
of the time, Isaac took over when they neared St. Thomas, 
and piloted the boat to the dock where it was discovered. 
Upon docking, Isaac left, telling Brown and Reid he would 
return. Shortly thereafter Brown and Reid were found and 
arrested. 
 
Brown testified that early in the trip he had planned to 
jump overboard and swim to safety, but he was dissuaded 
by Reid, who could not swim well. Neither made any further 
attempt to escape: they had never been far from Jamaica 
and did not know how to read the charts or use the global 
positioning system; moreover, until arrested, they did not 
encounter anyone whom they could ask for help. 
 
II. JURY INSTRUCTION ON REASONABLE DOUBT 
 
The district court instructed the jury that it could convict 
Isaac only if the government had proven him guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt, explaining the evidentiary standard as 
follows: 
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       Reasonable doubt is a term often used, probably well 
       understood, but not easily defined. Reasonable doubt 
       is what the term implies. The doubt must be 
       reasonable. It is not a mere possible or imaginary 
       doubt, because as you well know, everything relating to 
       human affairs, and depending on oral testimony, is 
       open to some possible or imaginary doubt. The 
       government is not required to produce evidence that 
       will exclude every possibility of a defendant's 
       innocence. It is only required to prove his guilt beyond 
       a reasonable doubt, not beyond all possible doubt. The 
       test is one of reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is 
       a fair doubt, based upon reason and common sense -- 
       the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person 
       hesitate to act. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt must, 
       therefore, be proof of such a convincing character that 
       you would be willing to rely and act upon it, 
       unhesitatingly, in the most important of your own 
       affairs. 
 
       While bearing in mind that it is rarely possible to prove 
       anything to an absolute certainty, you must remember, 
       as well, that a defendant must never be convicted on 
       mere assumption, conjecture or speculation. So if the 
       jury views the evidence in the case as reasonably 
       permitting either of two conclusions, one of innocence, 
       the other of guilt, the jury should, of course, adopt the 
       conclusion of innocence. 
 
       Reasonable doubt may arise also from a lack of 
       evidence or proof. If you find that the government has 
       failed to produce evidence sufficient to satisfy you of 
       the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, 
       then he is entitled to an acquittal, or a verdict of"not 
       guilty." But if, after considering all of the evidence and 
       giving the accused the benefit of a reasonable doubt, 
       both as to the evidence presented or the lack of 
       evidence, you are led to the conclusion that he is 
       guilty, you should so declare by your verdict. 
 
Isaac points to several aspects of this charge which, he 
contends, misled the jury by suggesting that an improperly 
low level of certainty was required for conviction, in 
violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 
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The Constitution requires that the government prove 
every element of criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt 
to obtain a conviction. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 
S. Ct. 1068, 1073 (1970). While a trial court must advise 
the jury of the government's burden of proof, no particular 
set of words is mandated. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5, 
114 S. Ct. 1239, 1243 (1994). Due process is satisfied if the 
instructions, taken as a whole, accurately convey the 
concept of reasonable doubt to the jury. Id. (citing Holland 
v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140, 75 S. Ct. 127, 137 
(1954)). Thus, although we have considered each of Isaac's 
criticisms, ultimately we must determine whether the entire 
instruction the jury received led it to apply the correct 
standard of proof. If not, Isaac's conviction will be reversed. 
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279-80, 113 S. Ct. 
2078, 2081-82 (1993). 
 
Isaac levels his most cogent criticism at the portion of the 
district court's instruction that directed the jury to find him 
not guilty if the evidence supported two inferences, one of 
guilt, the other of innocence. The Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals has held that the "two-inference" instruction is 
improper because it "may mislead a jury into thinking that 
the government's burden is somehow less than proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Inserra, 34 
F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Khan, 
821 F.2d 90, 93 (2d Cir. 1987)). In a decision issued three 
weeks after Isaac's trial, we urged trial courts to heed the 
Second Circuit's criticism of the "two-inference" instruction 
when it is specifically brought to their attention. United 
States v. Jacobs, 44 F.3d 1219, 1226 & n.9 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1835 (1995). Isaac's counsel did make a 
timely objection to this instruction, citing Khan. 
 
Although we disapproved of the "two-inference" 
instruction in Jacobs, we did not hold that the instruction 
was so constitutionally deficient per se that it infected the 
entire instruction on reasonable doubt. 44 F.3d at 1226. 
Accordingly, we will consider whether this deficiency was 
rectified by the remainder of the reasonable doubt 
instruction. 
 
Isaac argues that so much of the charge was phrased in 
terms of what reasonable doubt is not, that it only served 
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to confuse and mislead the jury. We disagree. The practice 
of defining reasonable doubt by what it is not is well 
established. For instance, the definition formulated by 
Justice Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
more than a century ago, which has served as a model 
instruction, begins by explaining that reasonable doubt "is 
not mere possible doubt . . . ." Victor, 511 U.S. at 8, 114 
S. Ct. at 1244 (quoting Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. 
295, 320 (1850)). More recently, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has affirmed judgments in two cases where the trial court 
explained reasonable doubt by contrasting what it is with 
what it is not. 511 U.S. at 7, 18, 114 S. Ct. at 1244, 1249. 
 
Here, the court contrasted reasonable doubt with "all 
possible doubt" and "imaginary doubt," and explained that, 
while it was not "absolute certainty," neither was it "mere 
conjecture or speculation." The court also stated the 
reasonable doubt was "a fair doubt" of the sort that would 
make a person hesitate to act. We are satisfied that the 
court made appropriate use of the negative examples, 
which were contrasted with positive examples to create a 
framework for the jury's understanding. 
 
Finally, Isaac objects to the court's explanation that proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt is "proof of such a convincing 
character that you would be willing to rely and act upon it, 
unhesitatingly, in the most important of your affairs." Isaac 
argues that this language was disapproved by the Supreme 
Court in Holland. We read the case differently. In Holland, 
the Court recommended that the reasonable doubt section 
of the jury charge be phrased "in terms of the kind of doubt 
that would make a person hesitate to act" rather than "the 
kind of doubt . . . which you folks in the more serious and 
important affairs of your own lives might be willing to act 
upon." 348 U.S. at 140, 75 S. Ct. at 138. Wefind that the 
instructions the court gave in this case properly heeded the 
Supreme Court's recommendation by stressing the need for 
convincing proof, and using the word "unhesitatingly." 
Moreover, in the preceding sentence of the charge, the 
court quoted the Holland formulation almost verbatim, 
stating that reasonable doubt is "the kind of doubt that 
would make a reasonable person hesitate to act." 
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As a whole, the court's instructions adequately conveyed 
the government's burden of proof to the jury. The court 
repeatedly stated that the government was required to 
prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the 
burden never shifted to the defendant. The court accurately 
explained that the standard was high, but not to the point 
of absolute certainty or to the exclusion of possibilities 
which defy common sense. By analogizing the standard of 
proof to the level of certainty an individual would require 
before unhesitatingly acting in important personal affairs, 
the court provided jurors with a comprehensible 
benchmark. Although the use of the "two-inference" 
example suggested that the standard is lower than it is, 
this defect was counterbalanced by the explanation that 
preceded and succeeded it. Accordingly, we conclude that 
the jury instruction, taken as a whole, was not 
constitutionally deficient. 
 
III. JURY INSTRUCTION ON WITNESS CREDIBILITY 
 
Isaac contends the district court violated his Fifth 
Amendment right to due process and a fair trial, and his 
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, by denying his 
request that the jury be instructed to weigh the testimony 
of Brown and Reid with greater care because they were 
immunized witnesses and accomplices.1 Although it would 
have been better had the district court given the 
instruction, we conclude that this jury was sufficiently 
apprized of the credibility concerns posed by the testimony 
of immunized witnesses Brown and Reid. 
 
We recognize that a witness who has been given a reward 
for cooperation has also been given an incentive to shade 
the truth or to lie. It may well be the better practice to give 
an instruction if requested. However, such an instruction is 
not required, especially when, as here, it has been made 
clear to the jury that it is permitted to disbelieve testimony 
to the extent it finds that the testimony was driven more by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Specifically, Isaac moved to include in the jury charge sections 15.03 
(immunized witness testimony) and 15.04 (accomplice testimony) from 
Devitt, Blackmar, Wolff & O'Malley, Federal Jury Practice and 
Instructions (4th ed. 1992). 
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a self-serving desire for leniency than a sense of duty to tell 
the truth. We have repeatedly approved the practice of 
counseling jurors to view the testimony of accomplices and 
immunized witnesses with skepticism and caution, 
particularly when it is uncorroborated and material to 
establishing the defendant's guilt. See, e.g., United States v. 
Rosa, 560 F.2d 149, 156 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. 
Bromwell, 467 F.2d 895, 896 (3d Cir. 1972); United States 
v. Schanerman, 150 F.2d 941, 943 (3d Cir. 1945); Marsh v. 
United States, 82 F.2d 703, 704 (3d Cir. 1936). 
Nevertheless, to date we have not determined whether it is 
error per se for a trial court to refuse to give such an 
instruction even when, as here, it was requested. Cf. United 
States v. Wright, 921 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1990) (considering 
whether it was plain error for court not to give an informant 
charge when defense counsel failed to make a timely 
request). We decline to do so now. 
 
It has long been recognized that testimony of accomplices 
and informers raises particular credibility problems since 
these witnesses have strong incentives to fabricate or mold 
their testimony as the government desires in order to 
escape prosecution, lighten their sentences, obtain 
remuneration or receive protection. See Cool v. United 
States, 409 U.S. 100, 103, 93 S. Ct. 354, 357 (1972); On 
Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 757, 72 S. Ct. 967, 973- 
74 (1952). Consequently, the defendant is entitled to broad 
latitude in probing the credibility of such witnesses by 
cross-examination, and to have the jury properly 
instructed. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 311- 
12, 87 S. Ct. 408, 418-19 (1966). Although no particular 
instruction is mandated, warning the jury to consider the 
testimony of an accomplice with great care and caution 
before relying on it is appropriate. Marsh, 82 F.2d at 704 
(citing Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 495, 37 
S. Ct. 192, 198 (1916); Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 
183, 203-04, 29 S. Ct. 260, 268 (1908). 
 
Courts were initially admonished to give cautionary 
instructions at a time when juries were counseled that 
witnesses are presumed to speak the truth. See Crawford, 
212 U.S. at 204, 29 S. Ct. at 268. We have held, however, 
that a defendant's right to the presumption of innocence is 
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violated if a jury is instructed that witnesses are presumed 
to speak the truth. United States v. Johnson, 371 F.2d 800, 
804-05 (3d Cir. 1967); accord United States v. Evans, 398 
F.2d 159, 162 (3d Cir. 1968). Juries are now advised that 
they are the judges of all witnesses' credibility. For 
instance, here the trial court said: 
 
       You can determine the truth by resolving the degree of 
       credibility or reliability of the witnesses who have been 
       produced before you. You are to decide the factual 
       situation by carefully scrutinizing and analyzing the 
       testimony of each and every witness, with a view 
       toward determining whether a witness is neutral or 
       friendly, or whether the witness has told the truth or 
       exaggerated his testimony. 
 
In this situation, the necessity for an immunized witness 
or accomplice instruction is reduced. Therefore, we prefer 
to allow the trial court the discretion to decide whether to 
include an immunized witness or accomplice instruction in 
the charge to the jury. See United States v. Smith, 789 F.2d 
196, 204 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting the trial court has wide 
discretion in charging the jury); see also United States v. 
Cook, 102 F.3d 249, 252 (7th Cir. 1996) (committing the 
decision to give an instruction on the credibility of informer 
testimony to the discretion of the trial court). The trial court 
will generally be acting within its discretion if it allows 
defense counsel broad latitude to probe the credibility of 
accomplices and immunized witnesses, and instructs the 
jury to consider whether the witnesses' self-serving motives 
in testifying have destroyed or diminished their credibility. 
An immunized witness or accomplice charge is advisable 
when the jury has not otherwise been sufficiently alerted to 
the credibility concerns posed by the testimony of witnesses 
over whom the government wields particular power to 
reward or punish. See Cook, 102 F.3d at 252. 
 
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by refusing to give a specific accomplice or 
immunized witness charge. First, Isaac's attorney was 
permitted to conduct a vigorous defense. He repeatedly 
pointed out in cross-examination and argument to the jury 
that the government had no direct evidence, beyond the 
testimony of Reid and Brown, that Isaac had ever been on 
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board the Community Aid or had forced Reid and Brown to 
accompany him from Jamaica. Isaac's attorney also 
brought out the facts that Reid and Brown had initially 
been indicted on the same charges as Isaac, and that they 
were represented by private counsel whose fees were being 
paid by an unknown source. Moreover, the cross- 
examination of Reid and Brown revealed that, although the 
charges against them had been dropped, they were still 
being kept in prison as material witnesses and realized they 
would not be freed until they had testified against Isaac. 
Thus, Isaac's counsel brought to the jury's attention factors 
which suggested that Reid and Brown might be motivated 
to give false evidence and that, without this suspect 
testimony, evidence of Isaac's involvement in the smuggling 
operation was slim. 
 
Second, the trial court instructed the jury that they were 
the judges of credibility and should consider the witnesses' 
motives, the circumstances under which they had testified 
and the relationship each might have to the prosecution or 
the defense. The court's instructions, taken together with 
defense counsel's vigorous attack on the credibility of Reid 
and Brown, certainly put the jury on notice that it had to 
weigh carefully the possible accomplices' testimony. See 
Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 311-12 & nn.12-14, 87 S. Ct. at 418-19 
& nn.12-14 (holding that no violation of the Due Process 
Clause occurred where the informer was rigorously cross- 
examined and the trial court both recapped the defendant's 
version of events for the jury and gave it a general 
instruction on assessing witness credibility). The fact that 
the jury acquitted Isaac of possessing marijuana on board 
a vessel arriving in the United States indicates that the jury 
took these instructions seriously, since Reid's and Brown's 
testimony, if credited, would have been sufficient to convict 
Isaac on this count as well. 
 
IV. JUDICIAL NOTICE OF DISMISSAL 
OF CHARGES AGAINST REID AND BROWN 
 
Isaac argues that his Fifth Amendment right to due 
process was violated when the court took judicial notice 
that all charges against Reid and Brown were dismissed, 
but did not add that this was done "in response to the 
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government's motion." Isaac contends that the omission 
"placed a judicial imprimatur and enhancement on the 
credibility of Brown and Reid" by implying that the court 
had independently dismissed the charges, presumably for 
lack of evidence. 
 
Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires the 
court to take judicial notice of facts "capable of accurate 
and ready determination by resort to sources whose 
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned" when a party 
requests that it do so and supplies the necessary 
information. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b), (d). In this instance, the 
fact that the charges against Reid and Brown had been 
dropped on the motion of the United States was readily 
ascertainable from the court order, entered into evidence at 
Isaac's trial as Exhibit F. Indeed, when the court ruled on 
the defendant's motion to take judicial notice of certain 
facts, the court agreed to include the words "in response to 
the government's motion"; their omission from the judicially 
noticed facts read to the jury seems to have been 
inadvertent, not deliberate. 
 
Nonetheless, the judicial order dismissing the charges 
against Brown and Reid was entered into evidence, and it 
clearly stated that the charges were dismissed on the 
motion of the government. In addition, the government's 
motion to designate Reid and Brown as material witnesses 
was also entered into evidence; the supporting affidavit 
stated that the drug charges had been dismissed "in the 
interest of justice and the witnesses['] cooperation," a point 
defense counsel drove home in his closing argument. 
Consequently, the jury was not misled into believing that 
the court had independently dismissed the charges against 
Brown and Reid. 
 
V. PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING ARGUMENT 
 
Finally, Isaac argues that his Fifth Amendment right not 
to testify was violated when the prosecutor stated, over 
defense counsel's objection, "Raymond Isaac captained that 
boat from Jamaica, and the only people who would know 
that Raymond Isaac captained that boat from Jamaica are 
Raymond Isaac, Conrad Brown, Irvin Reid, and that fourth 
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individual in Jamaica. Those are the only people." 
According to Isaac, the prosecutor was implying that Isaac's 
decision not to testify and give his version of what did or 
did not happen on the boat was evidence of his guilt. 
 
In Griffin v. State of California, the Supreme Court held 
that the Fifth Amendment prohibits the judge and 
prosecutor from suggesting to the jury that it may treat the 
accused's silence as substantive evidence of guilt. 350 U.S. 
609, 615, 85 S. Ct. 1229, 1233 (1965); see also Baxter v. 
Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 319, 96 S. Ct. 1551, 1558 
(1976). Otherwise, the defendant is penalized by the court 
for exercising his constitutional right not to incriminate 
himself. Griffin, 350 U.S. at 614, 85 S. Ct. at 1232-33. 
However, when the defendant uses his Griffin protection as 
a sword, rather than a shield, the prosecution may respond 
appropriately. See United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 
32, 108 S. Ct. 864, 869 (1988). For instance, in Robinson, 
the Supreme Court held that once defense counsel had 
asserted in closing argument that the government did not 
allow the defendant to tell his side of the story, it was not 
a violation of the Fifth Amendment for the prosecutor to 
respond by telling the jury that the defendant could have 
testified if he so chose. Id. at 26-28 & n.2, 108 S. Ct. at 866 
& n.2. Thus, we must consider the prosecutor's remarks in 
context to determine whether they are a fair response to an 
assertion by the defendant. Id. at 32-33, 108 S. Ct. at 869. 
 
When the prosecutor's statement here is considered in 
context, we find that, although it comes close to violating 
Griffin, it was a fair response to defense counsel's closing 
argument. Much of that argument was an attack on the 
credibility of Brown and Reid, whose testimony was key to 
proving numerous elements of the government's case. The 
prosecutor began his rebuttal by conceding that Brown and 
Reid were probably not the most upstanding individuals; 
however, there were no paragons of virtue present during 
the smuggling operation who could testify about it. In this 
context, the prosecutor's declaration that "the only people 
who would know that Raymond Isaac captained the boat 
are Raymond Isaac, Conrad Brown, Irvin Reid, and that 
fourth individual in Jamaica" comes across as an assertion 
that the government obtained its evidence from the only 
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available sources. Although the prosecutor would probably 
have been better advised, given Griffin, to omit the reference 
to Isaac, the comment was not "of such character that the 
jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a 
comment on the failure of the accused to testify." United 
States v. Chaney, 446 F.2d 571, 576 (3d Cir. 1971). 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Because we conclude that Isaac's rights under the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendments were not violated, his convictions 
on the counts of conspiracy to possess a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
S 846 and possession of a controlled substance with intent 
to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 841(a)(1) will be 
affirmed. 
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McKEE, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 
I concur in the judgment and the opinion of the majority. 
I write separately, however, to express my concern over the 
district court's "two-inference" jury instruction on 
reasonable doubt. 
 
In defining "reasonable doubt," the district court 
instructed the jury: 
 
        Reasonable doubt is a term often used, probably well 
       understood, but not easily defined. Reasonable doubt 
       is what the term implies. The doubt must be 
       reasonable. . . . The government is not required to 
       produce evidence that will exclude every possibility of 
       a defendant's innocence. It is only required to prove his 
       guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, not beyond all 
       possible doubt. The test is one of reasonable doubt. A 
       reasonable doubt is a fair doubt, based upon reason 
       and common sense -- the kind of doubt that would 
       make a reasonable person hesitate to act. . . . 
 
        While bearing in mind that it is rarely possible to 
       prove anything to an absolute certainty, you must 
       remember, as well, that a defendant must never be 
       convicted on mere assumption, conjecture or 
       speculation. So if the jury views the evidence in the 
       case as reasonably permitting either of two conclusions, 
       one of innocence, the other of guilt, the jury should, of 
       course, adopt the conclusion of innocence. 
 
        . . . But if, after considering all of the evidence and 
       giving the accused the benefit of a reasonable doubt, 
       both as to the evidence presented or the lack of 
       evidence, you are led to the conclusion that he is 
       guilty, you should so declare by your verdict. 
 
I agree with the majority that these instructions, taken as 
a whole, accurately conveyed the concept of reasonable 
doubt to the jury. In fact, the Supreme Court has expressly 
approved some of the language in the district court's 
charge. See, e.g., Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 
140 (1954) ("We think [the reasonable doubt] charge should 
have been in terms of the kind of doubt that would make 
a person hesitate to act."). Therefore, I am satisfied that 
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this approved language and other portions of the charge 
mitigated any harm that flowed from the language 
suggesting that conviction was appropriate if the jurors 
concluded that one inference was merely more likely than 
the other. 
 
Isaac's trial preceded this Court's decision in United 
States v. Jacobs, 44 F.3d 1219 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 
S. Ct. 1835 (1995), where we joined the Second Circuit in 
criticizing the two-inference language, see United States v. 
Inserra, 34 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Attanasio, 870 F.2d 809, 818 (2d Cir. 1989); United States 
v. Khan, 821 F.2d 90, 93 (2d Cir. 1987), and stated that 
district courts should not use that language "when it is 
specifically brought to the attention of trial judges in future 
cases," Jacobs, 44 F.3d at 1226. This trial court did not 
have the advantage of that guidance. Here, I write 
separately to reiterate that district courts should refrain 
from using the two-inference language, especially when, as 
here, the defendant objects to the language. 
 
The two-inference language standing alone "may mislead 
a jury into thinking that the government's burden is 
somehow less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Khan, 821 F.3d at 93; see also Inserra, 34 F.3d at 91 
(same); Attanasio, 870 F.2d at 818 (same). The language 
suggests that the government merely has to prove guilt by 
a preponderance of the evidence, the "least demanding 
standard." Livingstone v. North Belle Vernon Borough, 91 
F.3d 515, 534 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1311 
(1997). That standard is usually "appropriate to a typical 
civil case involving a monetary dispute between private 
parties." Id. (internal quotations omitted). Because society's 
stake in the outcome of this type of case is "minimal," "it is 
appropriate to [apply] a standard that allocates the risk of 
error between the litigants `in roughly equal fashion.' " Id. at 
534-35. The same is not true of criminal cases for which 
the standard proof beyond a reasonable doubt is reserved; 
"society wishes to `exclude as nearly as possible the 
likelihood of an erroneous judgment.' " Id. at 535. 
 
Another problem with the two-inference language is that 
it "does not go far enough." Khan, 821 F.2d at 93. "It 
instructs the jury on how to decide when the evidence of 
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guilt or innocence is evenly balanced, but says nothing on 
how to decide when the inference of guilt is stronger than 
the inference of innocence but no[t] strong enough to be 
beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. 
 
Hopefully, courts will refrain from including the two- 
inference language in their charges to the jury in the 
future. The language does not aid in clarifying the elusive 
concept of reasonable doubt which, as the district court 
below recognized, "is a term often used, probably well 
understood, but not easily defined." Indeed, rather than 
clarifying the concept, the language will often create a 
substantial risk of a criminal conviction based only upon a 
preponderance of proof. 
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